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I.  The issue of merging the social sciences might be 
thought of as an issue of categorization.  It may be that 
that things psychologists have learned about 
categorization and categories will illuminate this issue. 
 
Categories are made on the basis of shared similarity 
between stimuli – they function to group together things 
that are similar and distinguish these things from things 
that are different.  This is sometimes called “lumping and 
splitting”.  But all things are similar to other things in 
some ways and different in other things.  So the question 
becomes one of which dimensions should we focus on?  
With regards to the social sciences, the question is which 
dimensions of our disciplines are the proper ones to form 
groups around.  Should we focus on the dependent 
variables that are studied (which is more or less what we 
do now)?  The methods we use?  Political factors?   
Shared language/jargon? 
 
Psychologists who study categorization recognize that 
there are often trade-offs between the ease with which 
something can be put into a category and how informative 
the category is about the characteristics of its members.  
That is, categories with few “rules for entrance” make it 
easy to assign members yet aren’t terribly informative 
about the specific characteristics of the things in the 
category.  So, e.g., its easier to figure out if something is 
“an animal” than if it’s a “bear”, but the category of 
“bear” offers much more useful specific information 
about its members.  The level at which ease and 
specificity are maximized is called “the basic level”.  So 
one way to think about issues of merging is in terms of 
searching for the “basic level” of academic disciplines.  
Note that this implies that bigger categories are not 
necessarily better – unifying all the disciplines may not be 
better than specialization.  Both big and small categories 
have advantages – it depends on what advantages one 
wants to maximize. 
 
 The act of categorizing has known effects on how stimuli 
are perceived.  In particular, categorizing tends to make 
people focus on similarities between stimuli (or the 
dimensions on which categorization is based) and less on 
differences.  This means that any mergin of  our 
disciplines will result in “ways in which our disciplines 
differ” being lost.  Of course, specialization results in 
obfuscation of similarities as well. 
II.  Another way to think about the social sciences is in 
terms of levels of analysis.  John Cacioppo, a social 
psychophysiologist, has talked about this extensively.   
You can organize disciplines in a hierarchical way, micro 
to macro.  Many people think about social science in this 
way.  There is a tendency towards reductionism, such that 
lower, more micro levels are preferred.  Certainly 
academics tend to disdain levels above them and be 
threatened by levels below them.  But each level has its 
uses.  Reductionism is a dangerous trend – it suggests that 
lower levels subsume or completely explain higher levels, 
but this isn’t so.  Higher levels are a function of 
interactive aggregation of lower levels.  You can’t predict 
characteristics of an emergent system from knowledge of 
its subunits.  Also, levels influence each other – e.g., in 
doves, male social behavior affects female hormones 
which influences her social behavior; social support in 
humans affects RNA ascription.   From a scientific 
perspective, different levels inform and constrain 
inferences you can make at other levels – both up and 
down. 
 
Cacioppo recognizes two principles – the Principle of 
Multiple Determinism”, which states that phenomena 
have multiple determinants across levels, so you can’t just 
say that the causes of a phenomenon are at a lower level 
(e.g., “schizophrenia is caused by levels of dopamine”).  
The Principle of Nonadditive Determinism states that the 
properties of a whole are not predictable from its parts 
until the properties of the whole are documented.  Not 
that mapping of one level on another becomes 
increasingly more complex with the number of   
intervening levels.   
 
Disciplines at different levels have their own particular 
issues that they are best equipped to focus on.  Also, they 
have their own jargon, their own variables of interest, 
their own methods, and a history of studying them.   
Cacioppo, then, believes that unity of fields across levels 
may have disadvantages, especially if done in a 
reductionistic manner.  He does, however, believe that 
people should form cross-level collaborations to work on 
linkages between levels. 
 
III.  Psychology as a discipline has experienced this 
tension between unity and specialization in its history.  
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need to unify psychology before we can think about 
unifying social sciences.  Psychology spans multiple 
levels of analysis (but focuses on individual behavior, 
cognition, and affect mostly).  In our early days, we had a 
few unitary theories (gestalt, behaviorism, functionalism) 
which gave way to specialization.  Some people think that 
this is true of all maturing disciplines.  We do have a 
loose paradimg now – cognition.  In psychology, there is 
a certain loathing of big trends/paradigms (behaviorisms, 
cognition) – they are seen as totalitarian. 
 
It actually doesn’t make sense to talk about psychology as 
a unitary discipline – people’s level of identification is in 
terms of the major subareas – social, personality, clinical, 
developmental, cognitive, physiological.  There is tension 
between these areas.  There are also tensions between the 
applied and basic areas – this has long been a political 
battlefield.   Methods & analysis tend to be quite different 
across areas. 
 
Interestingly, much of the specialization in psychology is 
the result of links between the major subareas – social 
cognition, cross-cultural psychology, social 
psychophysiology, evolutionary psych.  So in a sense, in 
trying to unify, we specialize.  In any event, getting more 
specialized seems to be a function of knowing where 
interesting problems are that haven’t been tackled yet. 
 
Many psychology departments have tried breaking up or 
reorganizing psychology departments, often combining 
them with other disciplines.  This often is alog the lines of 
neuropsych with biology, social psych with sociology, 
applied disciplines and basic disciplines lumped together.  
There has not been a general pattern as to how effective 
this has been – there are political costs; proliferation is 
diluting and confusing to administrators and others.   
People in applied areas often prefer being close to the 
basic folks.  Often these “regroupings” are driven less by 
scientific integrity than personnel conflicts within 
departments or political forces. 